---
title: Virtue Ethics
section-id: ethics
sort: 130
author: Prof. James Okafor
created: 2026-02-24 09:00
modified: 2026-04-01 10:30
language: en
description: Aristotle's virtue ethics and its contemporary revival.
---

# Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics differs from consequentialism and deontology in its focus. Rather than asking ‘What should I do?’ as its primary question, virtue ethics asks ‘What kind of person should I be?’ and ‘What is a good human life?’ The central concepts are character, virtue, and flourishing.

## Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics

Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is the founding text of virtue ethics. Aristotle begins with the observation that every action and inquiry aims at some good, and asks what the highest good is—the good that is valued for its own sake and not as a means to something else. His answer is **eudaimonia**: often translated as ‘happiness’ but better understood as ‘flourishing’ or ‘living well.’

### Function and Flourishing
Aristotle argues from the concept of a thing’s **function** (*ergon*). A knife functions well when it cuts well; a flautist functions well when they play well. What is the function of a human being? Aristotle’s answer: the exercise of the soul in accordance with its distinctive rational capacity. Eudaimonia is the excellent exercise of our rational capacities over a complete life.

### The Virtues
Virtues are stable dispositions of character that allow us to perform our function well. Aristotle characterises virtues as **the mean between extremes**:

- Courage is the mean between cowardice and recklessness
- Generosity is the mean between miserliness and prodigality
- Honesty is the mean between deception and tactless bluntness

The mean is not arithmetic: it is the mean *for us*, relative to the situation. What counts as appropriate anger depends on what has happened, who has done it, and what relationship one has to them.

### Practical Wisdom
The virtues cannot be applied mechanically. **Practical wisdom** (*phronesis*) is the capacity to discern the right action in particular circumstances—to perceive what the situation calls for and to be moved to act accordingly. It is the master virtue, the one that ensures the other virtues are exercised well.

### Habituation
Virtues are acquired through practice. We become just by doing just acts, brave by doing brave acts. Character is not innate but developed through habituation within a community—initially by doing what virtue requires before we fully understand why, until the disposition becomes stable and the motivation internal.

## Objections to Aristotle

### Teleology
Aristotle’s ethics depends on the claim that human beings have a function. After Darwin, the idea of natural teleology—that kinds of things have natural ends or purposes—is difficult to sustain. Contemporary virtue ethicists often try to ground flourishing in more defensible claims about human nature and needs.

### Cultural Relativism
Aristotle’s list of virtues reflects the values of a particular culture (fourth-century BC Athens)—it includes magnanimity and proper pride in ways that seem parochial. Different cultures identify different character traits as virtues. Is there any universal account of what counts as a virtue?

### Action Guidance
Virtue ethics is sometimes criticised for providing insufficient guidance in hard cases. If you ask ‘What should I do?’, being told ‘What a virtuous person would do’ may not help if the virtuous person’s response is unclear or contested.

## Contemporary Revival

G.E.M. Anscombe’s influential 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ argued that consequentialism and deontology both rely on a morally legislative conception of obligation that is incoherent without its original theological grounding. She recommended returning to Aristotelian virtue concepts.

Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre developed neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in different ways. MacIntyre’s *After Virtue* argued that modern moral philosophy has lost the narrative framework within which virtue concepts made sense. Rosalind Hursthouse has applied virtue ethics to practical ethical questions, arguing that the question ‘what would a virtuous person do?’ is genuinely action-guiding in most cases.

## Care Ethics

Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings developed **care ethics** partly in response to virtue ethics and partly as an alternative to the dominant theories. Care ethics emphasises particular relationships, emotional responsiveness, and the ethics of care over abstract principles. It challenges the assumption that an impartial standpoint is morally primary, arguing that partiality—caring more for those with whom one has relationships—is not a moral failing but a moral good.

## Summary

- Virtue ethics asks what kind of person to be rather than what to do
- Aristotle grounds the virtues in eudaimonia (flourishing) and the human function
- Virtues are means between extremes, acquired by habituation, and exercised through practical wisdom
- Contemporary virtue ethics responds to objections about teleology, cultural relativity, and action guidance
- Care ethics emphasises particular relationships over impartial principles
