---
title: Further Reading
sort: 110
section-id: conclusion
description: Annotated bibliography organised by chapter, with commentary on essential secondary texts and resources for continued study.
language: en
---

# Further Reading

This annotated bibliography is organised by chapter. For each topic, the most accessible introductory texts are listed first, followed by more advanced or specialised works. All items marked **[Core]** are considered essential reading; unmarked items represent productive next steps for those wishing to go deeper.

---

## Part I: Epistemology

### What is Knowledge?
**[Core]** Gettier, E.L. (1963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" *Analysis*, 23(6), 121–123. — Three pages that changed epistemology. Required reading.

**[Core]** Chisholm, R. (1977). *Theory of Knowledge*, 2nd ed. Prentice Hall. — The classic textbook on epistemological foundations.

Zagzebski, L. (1994). "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems." *Philosophical Quarterly*, 44(174), 65–73. — Shows the structural depth of the problem.

Williamson, T. (2000). *Knowledge and Its Limits*. Oxford University Press. — Defends knowledge as a prime epistemic concept; difficult but rewarding.

### Perception and Reality
**[Core]** Ayer, A.J. (1956). *The Problem of Knowledge*. Penguin. — Accessible and wide-ranging.

Dancy, J. (1985). *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*. Blackwell. — Chapter 6 on perception is particularly good.

McDowell, J. (1994). *Mind and World*. Harvard University Press. — Demanding but essential for understanding the conceptualism debate.

### Scepticism
**[Core]** Descartes, R. (1641). *Meditations on First Philosophy*. — The primary source; any good translation suffices.

Stroud, B. (1984). *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism*. Oxford University Press. — Why scepticism cannot be easily dismissed.

DeRose, K. (2009). *The Case for Contextualism*. Oxford University Press.

### Truth
**[Core]** Horwich, P. (1998). *Truth*, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press. — Deflationary theory, clearly argued.

Lynch, M. (2009). *Truth as One and Many*. Oxford University Press. — Pluralist theory.

---

## Part II: Metaphysics

### Existence and Ontology
**[Core]** Quine, W.V.O. (1948). "On What There Is." *Review of Metaphysics*, 2(5). — The classic statement of Quinean ontology.

**[Core]** van Inwagen, P. (1998). "Meta-Ontology." *Erkenntnis*, 48(2–3), 233–250.

Thomasson, A. (2015). *Ontology Made Easy*. Oxford University Press. — Deflationary approach; valuable counterpoint to heavyweight ontology.

### Identity and Persistence
**[Core]** Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and Persons*, Part III. Oxford University Press. — The most influential modern treatment.

Lewis, D. (1976). "Survival and Identity." In Rorty, A. (ed.), *The Identities of Persons*. Berkeley.

Olson, E. (1997). *The Human Animal*. Oxford University Press. — Animalist view.

### Free Will
**[Core]** Kane, R. (1996). *The Significance of Free Will*. Oxford University Press. — Best defence of libertarianism.

**[Core]** Frankfurt, H. (1969). "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." *Journal of Philosophy*, 66(23). — Frankfurt cases; only five pages, transformative.

Strawson, P.F. (1962). "Freedom and Resentment." *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 48. — Foundational compatibilist paper.

Fischer, J.M. and Ravizza, M. (1998). *Responsibility and Control*. Cambridge University Press.

### Philosophy of Mind
**[Core]** Nagel, T. (1974). "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" *Philosophical Review*, 83(4). — The classic statement of the explanatory gap.

**[Core]** Chalmers, D. (1996). *The Conscious Mind*. Oxford University Press. — Comprehensive case for the hard problem.

Dennett, D. (1991). *Consciousness Explained*. Little, Brown. — The physicalist response; readable and provocative.

Jackson, F. (1986). "What Mary Didn't Know." *Journal of Philosophy*, 83(5). — Knowledge argument in five pages.

---

## Part III: Ethics

### Metaethics
**[Core]** Mackie, J.L. (1977). *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Penguin. — Error theory; accessible and well-argued.

Blackburn, S. (1998). *Ruling Passions*. Oxford University Press. — Best recent defence of quasi-realism.

Enoch, D. (2011). *Taking Morality Seriously*. Oxford University Press. — Strong defence of robust moral realism.

### Consequentialism
**[Core]** Mill, J.S. (1863). *Utilitarianism*. — Short; read in an afternoon; annotated editions recommended.

**[Core]** Singer, P. (1979). *Practical Ethics*. Cambridge University Press. — Applies utilitarian reasoning to live issues.

Parfit, D. (1984). *Reasons and Persons*, Part IV. — "Repugnant Conclusion" and population ethics; essential.

### Deontological Ethics
**[Core]** Kant, I. (1785). *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. Korsgaard. Cambridge UP. — Use Korsgaard's translation and commentary.

**[Core]** Ross, W.D. (1930). *The Right and the Good*, Chs. 1–2. Oxford University Press.

Scanlon, T.M. (1998). *What We Owe to Each Other*. Harvard University Press. — Contractualist deontology; rich and rewarding.

### Virtue Ethics
**[Core]** Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, Books I–II, X. — Any good translation.

**[Core]** Hursthouse, R. (1999). *On Virtue Ethics*. Oxford University Press.

MacIntyre, A. (1981). *After Virtue*. University of Notre Dame Press. — Polemical and influential.

### Political Philosophy
**[Core]** Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Harvard University Press. — Read at minimum Part I.

**[Core]** Nozick, R. (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Basic Books. — Especially Ch. 7 on distributive justice.

Kymlicka, W. (2002). *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press. — Best survey text.

---

## General Philosophy Reference

**Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy** (plato.stanford.edu) — Freely available online; peer-reviewed, regularly updated. An invaluable first resource for any philosophical topic.

**[Core]** Blackburn, S. (1996). *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press. — Concise, reliable reference for key terms.

Craig, E. (ed.) (1998). *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. — 10-volume scholarly reference.

---

## On Reading Philosophy

Philosophical texts reward rereading. A text that seems clear at first glance often conceals assumptions that become visible only on the third or fourth reading. Keep a running list of assumptions, note where each argument depends on undefended premises, and always ask: what would need to be true for this argument to fail?

Discussion and disagreement are essential. Read with a philosophical friend or in a seminar. The objections you make and receive in conversation will teach you more than any further reading.
