5.5 KiB
| title | section-id | sort | author | created | modified | language | description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Philosophy | ethics | 150 | Prof. James Okafor | 2026-02-28 09:00 | 2026-04-05 10:30 | en | Justice, liberty, equality, and the social contract from Hobbes to Rawls. |
Political Philosophy
Political philosophy asks about the justification and limits of political authority. Why should anyone obey the state? What makes a distribution of goods just? What does equal treatment require? These questions are as pressing practically as they are philosophically difficult.
The Social Contract
Social contract theories justify political authority by appeal to an agreement—actual or hypothetical—among those governed.
Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes described the state of nature as a ‘war of all against all,’ where life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ Rational self-interest gives everyone reason to escape this state by contracting with others to create a sovereign with near-absolute power. The sovereign’s authority is justified by the protection it provides. Hobbes’ argument implies that almost any government is preferable to the state of nature.
Locke
Locke’s state of nature is less dire: people have natural rights (to life, liberty, and property) and are generally governed by natural law. Government is justified by a contract in which individuals cede some rights in exchange for better protection of the remainder. If the government violates natural rights, the contract is void and revolution is justified. Locke’s argument provides the philosophical foundation for liberal democratic governance.
Rousseau
Rousseau held that human beings are naturally good but corrupted by society and its institutions. The social contract he envisaged produces a general will: the genuine common good, distinct from the mere sum of individual preferences. Submission to the general will is true freedom, since the general will is what we would will as rational, uncorrupted agents.
Rawls and Justice as Fairness
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) is the most influential work in twentieth-century political philosophy. Rawls revived the social contract tradition by asking what principles of justice rational agents would choose from behind a veil of ignorance: not knowing their natural talents, social position, conception of the good, or generation.
From behind the veil, Rawls argued, rational agents would choose two principles:
- The equal liberty principle: each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme for all
- The difference principle: social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they benefit the least advantaged members of society
The difference principle is more striking. Inequalities—in wealth, income, authority—are not inherently just or unjust; they are justified only when they work to improve the situation of the worst-off. A society in which inequality trickles down to the least advantaged is more just than a more equal society in which everyone is worse off.
Rawls’ framework was controversial on multiple fronts. Libertarians (Nozick) argued it was incompatible with rights to liberty; communitarians (MacIntyre, Sandel) argued it presupposed an ‘unencumbered self’ abstracted from its social roles and relationships.
Liberty
Isaiah Berlin distinguished negative liberty (freedom from external interference) from positive liberty (the actual capacity to realise one’s goals). Negative liberty requires only the absence of coercion; positive liberty may require provision of resources and opportunities.
The distinction matters for policy. Negative liberty justifies limiting the state’s role; positive liberty may justify extensive state intervention to ensure that everyone has the genuine capacity to live a chosen life. Many political debates—about welfare, education, healthcare—can be seen as disputes about which conception of liberty should take priority.
Equality
G.A. Cohen and Elizabeth Anderson have explored what equality of opportunity requires. Luck egalitarianism (Cohen) holds that inequalities arising from luck (circumstances of birth, natural talents) are unjust, while inequalities arising from genuine choice are not. Democratic equality (Anderson) holds that equality of opportunity requires eliminating oppressive social hierarchies, not just compensating for bad luck.
This debate has practical implications for education, healthcare, and affirmative action policies.
Legitimacy and Democracy
What makes a government legitimate? Mere effectiveness (Hobbes)? Consent of the governed? Procedural fairness? Output legitimacy (producing just outcomes)?
Democratic legitimacy is often grounded in consent, but actual consent is complicated: most citizens never explicitly consent to the government that rules them. Hypothetical consent (what would rational agents consent to?) faces the problem that different rational agents might consent to very different things depending on their values.
Summary
- Social contract theories (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) justify political authority through actual or hypothetical agreement
- Rawls’ difference principle holds that inequalities are just only if they benefit the least advantaged
- Berlin’s negative vs positive liberty distinction structures debates about the scope of the state
- Luck egalitarianism vs democratic equality: competing accounts of what equality of opportunity requires
- The basis of democratic legitimacy remains contested