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| title | sort | section-id | description | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Further Reading | 110 | conclusion | Annotated bibliography organised by chapter, with commentary on essential secondary texts and resources for continued study. | en |
Further Reading
This annotated bibliography is organised by chapter. For each topic, the most accessible introductory texts are listed first, followed by more advanced or specialised works. All items marked [Core] are considered essential reading; unmarked items represent productive next steps for those wishing to go deeper.
Part I: Epistemology
What is Knowledge?
[Core] Gettier, E.L. (1963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis, 23(6), 121–123. — Three pages that changed epistemology. Required reading.
[Core] Chisholm, R. (1977). Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. Prentice Hall. — The classic textbook on epistemological foundations.
Zagzebski, L. (1994). "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems." Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174), 65–73. — Shows the structural depth of the problem.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford University Press. — Defends knowledge as a prime epistemic concept; difficult but rewarding.
Perception and Reality
[Core] Ayer, A.J. (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin. — Accessible and wide-ranging.
Dancy, J. (1985). Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Blackwell. — Chapter 6 on perception is particularly good.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and World. Harvard University Press. — Demanding but essential for understanding the conceptualism debate.
Scepticism
[Core] Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy. — The primary source; any good translation suffices.
Stroud, B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford University Press. — Why scepticism cannot be easily dismissed.
DeRose, K. (2009). The Case for Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
Truth
[Core] Horwich, P. (1998). Truth, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press. — Deflationary theory, clearly argued.
Lynch, M. (2009). Truth as One and Many. Oxford University Press. — Pluralist theory.
Part II: Metaphysics
Existence and Ontology
[Core] Quine, W.V.O. (1948). "On What There Is." Review of Metaphysics, 2(5). — The classic statement of Quinean ontology.
[Core] van Inwagen, P. (1998). "Meta-Ontology." Erkenntnis, 48(2–3), 233–250.
Thomasson, A. (2015). Ontology Made Easy. Oxford University Press. — Deflationary approach; valuable counterpoint to heavyweight ontology.
Identity and Persistence
[Core] Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons, Part III. Oxford University Press. — The most influential modern treatment.
Lewis, D. (1976). "Survival and Identity." In Rorty, A. (ed.), The Identities of Persons. Berkeley.
Olson, E. (1997). The Human Animal. Oxford University Press. — Animalist view.
Free Will
[Core] Kane, R. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press. — Best defence of libertarianism.
[Core] Frankfurt, H. (1969). "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." Journal of Philosophy, 66(23). — Frankfurt cases; only five pages, transformative.
Strawson, P.F. (1962). "Freedom and Resentment." Proceedings of the British Academy, 48. — Foundational compatibilist paper.
Fischer, J.M. and Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and Control. Cambridge University Press.
Philosophy of Mind
[Core] Nagel, T. (1974). "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review, 83(4). — The classic statement of the explanatory gap.
[Core] Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. — Comprehensive case for the hard problem.
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown. — The physicalist response; readable and provocative.
Jackson, F. (1986). "What Mary Didn't Know." Journal of Philosophy, 83(5). — Knowledge argument in five pages.
Part III: Ethics
Metaethics
[Core] Mackie, J.L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin. — Error theory; accessible and well-argued.
Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press. — Best recent defence of quasi-realism.
Enoch, D. (2011). Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford University Press. — Strong defence of robust moral realism.
Consequentialism
[Core] Mill, J.S. (1863). Utilitarianism. — Short; read in an afternoon; annotated editions recommended.
[Core] Singer, P. (1979). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press. — Applies utilitarian reasoning to live issues.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons, Part IV. — "Repugnant Conclusion" and population ethics; essential.
Deontological Ethics
[Core] Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Korsgaard. Cambridge UP. — Use Korsgaard's translation and commentary.
[Core] Ross, W.D. (1930). The Right and the Good, Chs. 1–2. Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, T.M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Harvard University Press. — Contractualist deontology; rich and rewarding.
Virtue Ethics
[Core] Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Books I–II, X. — Any good translation.
[Core] Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
MacIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press. — Polemical and influential.
Political Philosophy
[Core] Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. — Read at minimum Part I.
[Core] Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books. — Especially Ch. 7 on distributive justice.
Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press. — Best survey text.
General Philosophy Reference
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu) — Freely available online; peer-reviewed, regularly updated. An invaluable first resource for any philosophical topic.
[Core] Blackburn, S. (1996). Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 3rd ed. Oxford University Press. — Concise, reliable reference for key terms.
Craig, E. (ed.) (1998). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. — 10-volume scholarly reference.
On Reading Philosophy
Philosophical texts reward rereading. A text that seems clear at first glance often conceals assumptions that become visible only on the third or fourth reading. Keep a running list of assumptions, note where each argument depends on undefended premises, and always ask: what would need to be true for this argument to fail?
Discussion and disagreement are essential. Read with a philosophical friend or in a seminar. The objections you make and receive in conversation will teach you more than any further reading.